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## ON TOTALLY BOUNDED GAMES

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The aim of this paper is to establish a closer connection between totally bounded games and compact-continuous ones (cf. the definitions below). It is known that each compact-continuous game is totally bounded. Here we show that each zero-sum two-person game of strategy with bounded payoff function is a dense subgame of a complete game, and thus, in particular, each totally bounded game is a dense subgame of a compact-continuous game.

For the background in game theory the reader is referred to [7], and in topology to [1] or [3].

Let  $(X, Y, P)$  be a game of strategy ([7], p. 114), i.e.,  $X$  and  $Y$  are the sets of strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively, and  $P: X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is the real-valued payoff function. Player I and Player II independently choose  $x$  in  $X$  and  $y$  in  $Y$ , respectively. If  $P(x, y) \geq 0$ , then Player I receives from Player II the amount  $P(x, y)$ ; if  $P(x, y) < 0$ , then Player II receives from Player I the amount  $|P(x, y)|$ . Player I (Player II) tries to maximize (minimize, resp.) the value of  $P(x, y)$ . The game  $(X, Y, P)$  is said to be determined if

$$\sup_x \inf_y P(x, y) = \inf_y \sup_x P(x, y).$$

In the sequel we assume that the payoff function  $P$  is bounded.

The natural (intrinsic) pseudometric  $p_x$  for  $X$  and  $p_y$  for  $Y$  is defined by the formula

$$p_x(x_1, x_2) = \sup_y |P(x_1, y) - P(x_2, y)|$$

and

$$p_y(y_1, y_2) = \sup_x |P(x, y_1) - P(x, y_2)|$$

respectively [2, 7, 9, 10]. Let us notice that one can convert the pseudometrics into metrics by identifying points which are not distinguished by the corresponding pseudometrics; the conversion has no influence on strategic properties of the game.

It is easy to check that

$$|P(x_1, y_1) - P(x_2, y_2)| \leq p_x(x_1, x_2) + p_y(y_1, y_2).$$

Hence it follows that  $P$  is uniformly continuous with respect to the product pseudometric  $p_{X \times Y}$  defined by the formula

$$p_{X \times Y}((x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)) = p_X(x_1, x_2) + p_Y(y_1, y_2).$$

A game  $(A, B, Q)$  is said to be a *subgame* of a game  $(X, Y, P)$  if  $A \subset X$ ,  $B \subset Y$  and  $Q = P|(A \times B)$ .

From the definition of the natural pseudometrics it follows immediately that for any subgame  $(A, B, Q)$  of  $(X, Y, P)$  we have

$$p_A \leq p_X|(A \times A) \quad \text{and} \quad p_B \leq p_Y|(B \times B).$$

A game  $(A, B, Q)$  is said to be a *dense subgame* of a game  $(X, Y, P)$  if  $A$  and  $B$  are dense subsets of the pseudometric spaces  $(X, p_X)$  and  $(Y, p_Y)$  respectively, and  $Q = P|(A \times B)$ .

Let us notice that for any dense subgame  $(A, B, Q)$  of  $(X, Y, P)$  we have

$$p_A = p_X|(A \times A) \quad \text{and} \quad p_B = p_Y|(B \times B).$$

Furthermore, one can easily prove that

$$\sup_a \inf_b Q(a, b) = \sup_x \inf_y P(x, y)$$

and

$$\inf_b \sup_a Q(a, b) = \inf_y \sup_x P(x, y).$$

We say that a game  $(X, Y, P)$  is *complete* if the pseudometric spaces  $(X, p_X)$  and  $(Y, p_Y)$  are complete (cf. [3], Chapter 6).

**Theorem 1.** *Each game  $(X, Y, P)$  is a dense subgame of a complete game  $(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{P})$ , i.e., each game has a completion.*

**Proof.** Let  $(\bar{X}, \bar{p}_X)$  and  $(\bar{Y}, \bar{p}_Y)$  be the completions of  $(X, p_X)$  and  $(Y, p_Y)$  respectively. Then setting

$$\bar{p}_{X \times Y}((\bar{x}_1, \bar{y}_1), (\bar{x}_2, \bar{y}_2)) = \bar{p}_X(\bar{x}_1, \bar{x}_2) + \bar{p}_Y(\bar{y}_1, \bar{y}_2)$$

we get a complete pseudometric for  $\bar{X} \times \bar{Y}$  so that

$$\bar{p}_{X \times Y}|(X \times Y \times X \times Y) = p_{X \times Y}$$

and  $X \times Y$  is dense in  $(\bar{X} \times \bar{Y}, \bar{p}_{X \times Y})$ . Since  $P$  is uniformly continuous with respect to  $p_{X \times Y}$ , there is a function  $\bar{P}: \bar{X} \times \bar{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  such that  $\bar{P}|(X \times Y) = P$  and  $\bar{P}$  is uniformly continuous with respect to  $\bar{p}_{X \times Y}$ . Since  $(X, Y, P)$  is a subgame of  $(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{P})$ , it suffices to prove that  $\bar{p}_X = p_X$  and  $\bar{p}_Y = p_Y$ . We shall show that  $\bar{p}_X = p_X$  only, because the other equality can be shown similarly. So, let  $\bar{x}, \bar{z} \in \bar{X}$ . To prove that  $p_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) \leq \bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z})$ , let us take any  $\varepsilon > 0$  and Cauchy sequences  $(x_1, x_2, \dots)$  and

$(z_1, z_2, \dots)$  in  $(X, p_X)$  so that  $\bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, x_n) \rightarrow 0$  and  $\bar{p}_X(\bar{z}, z_n) \rightarrow 0$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . Then we have

$$p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) = \sup_y |\bar{P}(\bar{x}, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)| = \sup_y |\bar{P}(\bar{x}, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)|,$$

because  $Y$  is dense in  $(\bar{Y}, \bar{p}_Y)$  and  $|\bar{P}(\bar{x}, \cdot) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, \cdot)|$  is continuous on  $(\bar{Y}, \bar{p}_Y)$ . Hence

$$p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) < |\bar{P}(\bar{x}, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)| + \varepsilon$$

for some  $y \in Y$ . However,

$$\begin{aligned} & |P(\bar{x}, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)| \leq \\ & \leq |\bar{P}(\bar{x}, y) - P(x_n, y)| + |P(x_n, y) - P(z_n, y)| + |P(z_n, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)|, \end{aligned}$$

where  $|\bar{P}(\bar{x}, y) - P(x_n, y)| \rightarrow 0$  and  $|P(z_n, y) - \bar{P}(\bar{z}, y)| \rightarrow 0$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , because  $\bar{P}(\cdot, y)$  is continuous on  $(\bar{X}, \bar{p}_X)$ . Hence there is an  $m \in N$  such that for each  $n \geq m$  we have

$$p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) < |P(x_n, y) - P(z_n, y)| + 3\varepsilon \leq p_X(x_n, z_n) + 3\varepsilon.$$

However,

$$p_X(x_n, z_n) = \bar{p}_X(x_n, z_n) \leq \bar{p}_X(x_n, \bar{x}) + \bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + \bar{p}_X(\bar{z}, z_n)$$

and

$$\bar{p}_X(x_k, \bar{x}) < \varepsilon \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{p}_X(z_k, \bar{z}) < \varepsilon$$

for some  $k \geq m$ . Therefore

$$p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) < \bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + 5\varepsilon.$$

Finally, we prove the inequality  $\bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) \leq p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z})$ . Clearly

$$\bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) \leq \bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, x_n) + \bar{p}_X(x_n, z_n) + \bar{p}_X(z_n, \bar{z})$$

and hence

$$\bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) < \bar{p}_X(x_n, z_n) + 2\varepsilon$$

for some  $n \in N$ . However

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{p}_X(x_n, z_n) &= p_X(x_n, z_n) \leq p_{\bar{X}}(x_n, z_n) \leq p_{\bar{X}}(x_n, \bar{x}) + \\ &+ p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{z}, z_n) \leq \bar{p}_X(x_n, \bar{x}) + p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + \bar{p}_X(\bar{z}, z_n) < p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + 2\varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

and hence

$$\bar{p}_X(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) < p_{\bar{X}}(\bar{x}, \bar{z}) + 4\varepsilon.$$

The proof is complete.

**Remark 1.** The families  $\{P(\cdot, y): y \in Y\}$  and  $\{P(x, \cdot): x \in X\}$  of functions induce the natural uniformities  $\mathcal{U}_X$  and  $\mathcal{U}_Y$  on  $X$  and  $Y$  respectively. Then

obviously  $P$  is separately uniformly continuous on the product of the uniformities  $(X, \mathcal{U}_X)$  and  $(Y, \mathcal{U}_Y)$ . The following result, analogous to Theorem 1, was obtained by N. J. Young ([11], Theorem 7):  $P$  admits a separately uniformly continuous extension  $\bar{P}$  onto the product of completions  $(\bar{X}, \bar{\mathcal{U}}_X)$  and  $(\bar{Y}, \bar{\mathcal{U}}_Y)$  iff  $P$  satisfies the repeated limit condition, i.e.,

$$\lim_m \lim_n P(x_m, y_n) = \lim_n \lim_m P(x_m, y_n)$$

provided that both iterated limits exist.

We say that a game  $(X, Y, P)$  is *totally bounded* if the pseudometric spaces  $(X, p_X)$  and  $(Y, p_Y)$  are totally bounded (cf. [1], p. 332).

Let us notice that a game  $(X, Y, P)$  is totally bounded iff at least one of the spaces  $(X, p_X)$  and  $(Y, p_Y)$  is totally bounded (A. Wald [10], 2.1.3). Furthermore, each subgame of a totally bounded game is also totally bounded, because each subspace of a totally bounded pseudometric space is totally bounded.

Totally bounded games constitute a natural generalization of matrix games because for each  $\varepsilon > 0$  there is a finite subgame which is  $\varepsilon$ -close to the given game (cf. [10], Theorem 2.3).

A game  $(X, Y, P)$  is said to be *compact-continuous* (J. E. Fenstad [2]) if  $X$  and  $Y$  are compact and  $P$  is continuous on  $X \times Y$ .

Since the completion of a totally bounded pseudometric space is totally bounded, and each totally bounded complete pseudometric space is compact, by Theorem 1 we get

**Corollary.** *Each totally bounded game  $(X, Y, P)$  is a dense subgame of the compact-continuous game  $(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{P})$ .*

**Remark 2.** It is well known that the mixed extension of a compact-continuous game constituted by countably additive probability Borel measures is again a compact-continuous game, where both players have optimal strategies. On the other hand, there are several types of mixed extensions of totally bounded games that are determined (cf. J. Kindler [4, 5]), and moreover, the players have optimal mixed strategies which are finitely additive probability Borel measures (J. E. Fenstad [2]). However, countably additive optimal mixed strategies need not exist in general (cf. [2]). Now, according to Corollary, if  $(X, Y, P)$  is totally bounded, then the players have optimal strategies which are countably additive probability measures defined on Borel  $\sigma$ -fields of the completions  $\bar{X}$  and  $\bar{Y}$ . (Note that the values of the mixed extensions of  $(X, Y, P)$  and  $(\bar{X}, \bar{Y}, \bar{P})$  coincide.)

It is easy to show that each compact-continuous game is totally bounded and complete. Hence, by Corollary, we get

**Theorem 2.** *A game  $(X, Y, P)$  is totally bounded iff it is a (dense) subgame of a compact-continuous game.*

Remark 3. Theorem 2 reaches beyond the scope of the game theory. E.g., its topological version reads as follows: a function  $P: X \times Y \rightarrow R$ , where  $X$  and  $Y$  are sets, can be extended to a continuous function  $P_1: X_1 \times Y_1 \rightarrow R$ , where  $X_1$  and  $Y_1$  are compact spaces, iff  $P$  is bounded and the pseudometric space  $(X, p_x)$  is totally bounded. In view of that interpretation, Theorem 2 is analogous to the following result of V. Pták [8]: a function  $P: X \times Y \rightarrow R$ , where  $X$  and  $Y$  are sets, can be extended to a separately continuous function  $P_2: X_2 \times Y_2 \rightarrow R$ , where  $X_2$  and  $Y_2$  are compact spaces, iff  $P$  is separately bounded and satisfies the repeated limit condition (cf. Remark 1 above).

Remark 4. Denote by  $(X^*, Y^*, P^*)$  the mixed extension of  $(X, Y, P)$  consisting of finite mixtures of pure strategies (i.e.,  $X^*$  is the set of all  $x^* \in [0, 1]^X$  such that  $x^*(x) = 0$  for all but finitely many  $x \in X$ ,  $x^*(x) \geq 0$  for all  $x \in X$ ,  $\sum_x x^*(x) = 1$ ,

etc.). If  $(X, Y, P)$  is a totally bounded game, then

(\*) for each subgame  $(A, B, Q)$  of  $(X, Y, P)$  the games  $(A^*, B^*, Q^*)$  and  $(A^*, B^*, -Q^*)$  are determined.

However, (\*) holds iff  $P$  satisfies the repeated limit condition (J. Kindler [4, 5, 6] and N. J. Young [11]). Next, the repeated limit condition is equivalent to the following:

$$\int_X \int_Y P \, d\eta \, d\xi = \int_Y \int_X P \, d\xi \, d\eta$$

for each pair of finitely additive probability measures  $\xi$  and  $\eta$  defined for all subsets of  $X$  and  $Y$  respectively (cf. [5] and [12]). The assumption of the total boundedness of  $(X, Y, P)$  is therefore too strong, even for getting (\*); it incorporates, however, a reasonable condition ensuring the equality of repeated integrals of  $P$  with respect to countably additive probability measures on  $X$  and  $Y$ . On the other hand, so far there is no topological characterization of those functions  $P: X \times Y \rightarrow R$  for whose the analogue of (\*) holds with the mixed extensions constituted by the countably additive probability measures on  $X$  and  $Y$ .

Remark 5. The above definitions and theorems can be extended to non-cooperative games  $(X_1, \dots, X_n, P_1, \dots, P_n)$  of  $n$  players, where all  $P_i: x_1 \times \dots \times X_n \rightarrow R$  are bounded. To be more specific, let

$$p_i^j(x_i, x_i') = \sup |P_j(x_1, \dots, x_n) - P_j(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_i', x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)|$$

where the supremum is taken over all  $(x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$ , and

$$p_i(x_i, x_i') = \sum_{j=1}^n p_i^j(x_i, x_i').$$

Then  $p_i$  is a pseudometric on  $X_i$  and it is easy to check that for each  $k \leq n$

$$|P_k(x_1, \dots, x_n) - P_k(x_1', \dots, x_n')| \leq \sum_{i=1}^n p_i(x_i, x_i').$$

Thus each  $P_k$  is uniformly continuous with respect to the product pseudometric

$$p((x_1, \dots, x_n), (x'_1, \dots, x'_n)) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i(x_i, x'_i).$$

Assuming that all  $(X_i, p_i)$  are totally bounded it is easy to show that also all  $(\bar{X}_i, \bar{p}_i)$  are totally bounded. Hence the completions  $(\bar{X}_i, \bar{p}_i)$  of  $(X_i, p_i)$  are compact and the extensions  $\bar{P}_k$  of  $P_k$  are continuous on  $(\bar{X}_1 \times \dots \times \bar{X}_n, \sum_{i=1}^n \bar{p}_i)$ . Let us note, moreover, that in the case of  $n=2$ , it is sufficient to assume that  $(X_1, p_1^1)$  and  $(X_2, p_2^2)$  are totally bounded, since then  $(X_1, p_1^2)$  and  $(X_2, p_2^1)$  are totally bounded by a theorem of A. Wald ([9], 2.1.3). For  $n \geq 3$ , however, the assumption of the total boundedness of all  $(X_i, p_i^i)$  cannot be weakened in general, as the following example shows:  $X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = \{1, 2, \dots, n, \dots\}$ ,  $P_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \text{sgn}(x_2 - x_3)$ , and  $P_2 = P_3 = 0$ .

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## О ВПОЛНЕ ОГРАНИЧЕННЫХ ИГРАХ

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### Резюме

В работе доказывается, что каждая стратегическая игра с ограниченной функцией выигрыша является плотной подигрой полной игры. Отсюда получается, что каждая вполне ограниченная игра является плотной подигрой компактно-непрерывной игры.