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Keywords:
coalition formation; hedonic games; Nash stability; top responsiveness
coalition formation; hedonic games; Nash stability; top responsiveness
Summary:
Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [AR] to guarantee the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is imposed.
References:
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