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DENUMERABLE MARKOV STOPPING GAMES WITH RISK-SENSITIVE TOTAL REWARD CRITERION

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This paper studies Markov stopping games with two players on a denumerable state space. At each decision time player II has two actions: to stop the game paying a terminal reward to player I, or to let the system to continue its evolution. In this latter case, player I selects an action affecting the transitions and charges a running reward to player II. The performance of each pair of strategies is measured by the risk-sensitive total expected reward of player I. Under mild continuity and compactness conditions on the components of the model, it is proved that the value of the game satisfies an equilibrium equation, and the existence of a Nash equilibrium is established.

Keywords: monotone operator, fixed point, equilibrium equation, Nash equilibrium, hitting time, bounded rewards

Classification: 91A10, 91A15

1. INTRODUCTION

This note concerns with discrete-time Markov stopping games evolving on a denumerable state space. The system is directed by two players, and at each decision time player II always can choose between two possible actions, namely, to stop the game, or to let the system to continue its evolution. In this latter case, player I selects an action affecting the transitions and charges a running reward to player II, whereas if the game is stopped, player II pays a terminal reward to player I. It is supposed that player I has a nonnull and constant risk sensitivity coefficient, and tries to maximize his total (risk-sensitive) expected reward, whereas player II tries to minimize it. Besides mild continuity conditions, the main structural conditions on the game concern with the reward structure, namely, it is supposed that the terminal reward function is nonnegative, and that the running reward is always larger than a positive constant. In this framework, the main problems analyzed in this note are as follows:

- to establish an equilibrium equation characterizing the value function of the game, and
- to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

In a risk-neutral context, these problems have been recently studied in Martínez-Cortés (2021) [20], where Markov stopping games with total reward criterion on a finite state space were analyzed under the assumption that the system has an absorbing state, a context that generalizes the discounted framework in Cavazos-Cadena and Hernández-Hernández (2012) [8]. On the other hand, in Cavazos-Cadena et al. (2021) [9] the risk-neutral total reward criterion was studied under the assumption that the state space is denumerable and the system has an absorbing state, whereas in Cavazos-Cadena et al. (2021) [10] this last condition was replaced by the assumption that the Markov chain induced by any stationary policy of player I is communicating and has an invariant distribution. More recently, in a risk-sensitive framework the problems posed above were studied in López-Rivero et al. (2022) [19] under the condition that the system has an absorbing state which can be reached regardless of the initial point. The results presented in this paper extend those reported in Cavazos-Cadena and Hernández-Hernández (2012) [8], where the total expected discounted reward is considered as a performance criterion. The main difference between the results presented in this paper and those already available in the literature can be summarized as follows: the conclusions obtained in this note involve only mild restrictions on the reward structure but, in contrast with other related works, no restriction is imposed on the transition law.

A starting benchmark in the study of discrete-time Markov models with risk-sensitive criteria was settled in Howard and Matheson (1972) [16], where controlled Markov chains on a finite state space were analyzed and, under communication conditions, the optimal risk-sensitive average cost was characterized in terms of an optimality equation. Those basic results have been extended to the case of a general transition structure in Cavazos-Cadena and Hernández-Hernández (2006) [7] for uncontrolled models, and for controlled models in Alanís Durán and Cavazos-Cadena (2012) [1]. Controlled Markov decision processes with finite or denumerable state-space endowed with risk-sensitive criteria have been studied, for instance, in Bäuerle and Rieder (2014) [3], Borkar and Meyn (2002) [6], Denardo and Rothblum (2006) [11], Sladký (2009, 2010, 2018) ([23, 24, 25]) whereas Markov decision processes on a general state space are analyzed, for instance, in Di Masi and Stettner (1999, 2000, 2007) ([12, 13, 14]) or Jaśkiewicz (2007) [17]. Applications of risk-sensitive criteria are presented, for example, in the area of mathematical finance (Bäuerle and Rieder 2011 [2], Bielecki et al. 1999 [5], Pitera and Stettner 2016 [21], Stettner 1999 [26]), and in large deviations (Balaji and Meyn 2000 [4], Kontoyiannis and Meyn, 2003 [18]).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the Markov stopping game is formally defined, the performance criterion is formulated, the concept of Nash equilibrium is introduced and the main structural conditions are stated as Assumption 2.1. Next, the main conclusions of the paper are presented as Theorem 3.3, a result that is proved in Section 5 after the necessary preliminaries given in Section 4. The approach to achieve this goal is to apply results referent to stopping times as well as dynamic programming techniques. Finally, the paper concludes with some brief comments in Section 6.

Notation: Given a nonempty set $\mathbb{M}$, the Banach space $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{M})$ consist of all continuous functions $R: \mathbb{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ whose supremum norm $\|R\|$ is finite, where $\|R\| := \sup_{k \in \mathbb{M}} |R(k)|$, whereas $\mathbb{N}$ stands for the set of nonnegative integers. The indicator function of an

event A is denoted by $I[A]$ and, even without explicit mention, all relations involving conditional expectations are valid with probability 1 with respect to the underlying probability measure. The minimum of the empty set is ∞ and, finally, the following convention concerning summations will be used:

$$\sum_{t=n}^m a_t := 0, \quad m < n. \quad (1)$$

2. THE MODEL

In this section the dynamic model studied in the paper is formally introduced. A Markov stopping game with two players labeled I and II is given by $\mathcal{G} = (S, A, \{A(x)\}_{x \in S}, R, G, P)$, a mathematical structure whose components have the following meaning: The (nonempty) denumerable set S is the state space and is endowed with the discrete topology, the metric space A is the action set and, for each $x \in S$, $A(x) \subset A$ is the nonempty class of admissible actions at x for player I. The next components, $R \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{K})$ and $G \in \mathcal{B}(S)$ are the running and terminal reward functions, respectively, where $\mathbb{K} := \{(x, a) \mid a \in A(x), x \in S\}$ is the class $\mathbb{K}$ of admissible pairs. Finally, $P = [p_{x,y}(a)]$ is the controlled transition law on S given $\mathbb{K}$, so that $p_{x,y}(a) \geq 0$ and $\sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(a) = 1$ for each $(x, a) \in \mathbb{K}$. The evolution of the dynamic system is as follows: Each player observes the state of the system at each time $t \in \mathbb{N}$, say $X_t = x \in S$, and player II must select one of two actions: To *stop* the system paying a terminal reward $G(x)$ to player I, or to let the system *to continue* its evolution. In this latter case, using the observed state $X_t = x$ as well the record of previous states and actions, player I selects and applies an action (control) $A_t = a \in A(x)$, an intervention which has two consequences: (a) player I gets a reward $R(x, a)$ from player II, and (b) the system jumps to $X_{t+1} = y \in S$ with probability $p_{x,y}(a)$; this is the Markov property of the decision process. The following structural assumption will be enforced.

Assumption 2.1. (i) For each $x \in S$, $A(x)$ is a compact subset of A .

(ii) For every $x, y \in S$, the mappings $a \mapsto R(x, a)$ and $a \mapsto p_{x,y}(a)$ are continuous in $a \in A(x)$.

(iii) $G(x) \geq 0$ for each $x \in S$.

(iv) There exists $\delta > 0$ such that $R(x, a) \geq \delta$ for every $(x, a) \in \mathbb{K}$.

Decision Strategies. Consider the model $\mathcal{G}$ defined above and, for each $t = 0, 1, \dots$ define the space $\mathbb{H}_t$ of possible histories up to time t as $\mathbb{H}_0 := S$ and $\mathbb{H}_t := \mathbb{K}^t \times S$ when $t > 0$. A generic element of $\mathbb{H}_t$ is a vector of the form $\mathbf{h}_t = (x_0, a_0, \dots, x_i, a_i, \dots, x_t)$ where $a_i \in A(x_i)$ and $x_i \in S$. Then a control policy is a sequence $\pi = \{\pi_t\}$ of stochastic kernels, that is, for each $t \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\mathbf{h}_t \in \mathbb{H}_t$, $\pi_t(\cdot | \mathbf{h}_t)$ is a probability measure on A concentrated on $A(x_t)$, and the mapping $\mathbf{h}_t \mapsto \pi_t(B | \mathbf{h}_t)$, $\mathbf{h}_t \in \mathbb{H}_t$, is Borel measurable for each Borel subset $B \subset A$. The class of all policies constitutes the family of *admissible strategies for player I* and is denoted by $\mathcal{P}$. Thus, when player I drives the system using π , the control A_t applied at time t belongs to $B \subset A$ with probability $\pi_t(B | \mathbf{h}_t)$, where

$\mathbf{h}_t$ is the observed history of the process up to time t . Given the policy $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$ and the initial state $X_0 = x$, the distribution of the state-action process $\{(X_t, A_t)\}$ is uniquely determined (Hernández-Lerma 1988 [15], Puterman 1994 [22]); such distribution is denoted by P_x^π which is defined on the Borel σ -field of the space $\mathbb{H} := \prod_{t=0}^\infty \mathbb{K}$, and the corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E_x^π . Next, define $\mathbb{F} := \prod_{x \in S} A(x)$ and notice that $\mathbb{F}$ is a compact metric space, which consists of all functions $f: S \rightarrow A$ such that $f(x) \in A(x)$ for each $x \in S$. A policy π is *stationary* if there exists $f \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $\pi_t(\{f(x_t)\}|\mathbf{h}_t) = 1$, and in this case π and f are naturally identified, a convention allowing to write $\mathbb{F} \subset \mathcal{P}$. Next, let the σ -algebra $\mathcal{F}_t$ be defined by

$$\mathcal{F}_t := \sigma(X_0, A_0, \dots, X_{t-1}, A_{t-1}, X_t), \quad t \in \mathbb{N}, \quad (2)$$

and define $\mathcal{T}$ as the class of all stopping times $\tau: \mathbb{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$ with respect to the filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t\}$, that is, for each nonnegative integer t , the event $[\tau = t]$ belongs to $\mathcal{F}_t$. $\mathcal{T}$ corresponds to the space of *strategies for player II*.

Exponential Utility. Throughout the remainder it is supposed that player I has a constant risk-sensitivity coefficient $\lambda \neq 0$, which means that a random reward Y is assessed via the expectation of $U_\lambda(Y)$, where the utility function $U_\lambda: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is defined by

$$U_\lambda(x) := \text{sign}(\lambda)e^{\lambda x}, \quad x \in S; \quad (3)$$

observe that $U_\lambda(\cdot)$ is a strictly increasing function and that the following relation holds

$$U_\lambda(x + y) = e^{\lambda x} U_\lambda(y), \quad x, y \in \mathbb{R}; \quad (4)$$

as usual, set $U_\lambda(\infty) := \infty$ if $\lambda > 0$ and $U_\lambda(\infty) := 0$ if $\lambda < 0$. When choosing between two random rewards W and Y , player I prefers Y if $E[U_\lambda(W)] < E[U_\lambda(Y)]$, and is indifferent between both rewards when $E[U_\lambda(W)] = E[U_\lambda(Y)]$. The certainty equivalent of Y (with respect to U_λ) is the constant $\mathcal{E}_\lambda(Y) \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty, \infty\}$ satisfying $U_\lambda(\mathcal{E}_\lambda(Y)) = E[U_\lambda(Y)]$, so that player I is indifferent between receiving a random reward Y or the corresponding certainty equivalent $\mathcal{E}_\lambda(Y)$; observe that

$$\mathcal{E}_\lambda(Y) := \log(E[e^{\lambda Y}])/\lambda. \quad (5)$$

Performance Criterion. Given the initial state $X_0 = x \in S$, suppose that players I and II drive the system using strategies $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$ and $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, respectively. The total (random) reward obtained by player I until the system is halted at time τ by player II is given by

$$I[\tau < \infty] \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau) \right) + I[\tau = \infty] \sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t)$$

and the corresponding certainty equivalent is the *performance index* $V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau)$ associated with the pair $(\pi, \tau) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{T}$ at state $x \in S$, that is,

$$V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) := \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left(E_x^\pi \left[I[\tau < \infty] e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau))} + I[\tau = \infty] e^{\lambda \sum_{t=0}^\infty R(X_t, A_t)} \right] \right); \quad (6)$$

see (5). Observe that the nonnegativity of R and G yield that

$$V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) \geq 0, \quad (7)$$

and that (6) is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau)) = E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\ + E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R(X_t, A_t) \right) I[\tau = \infty] \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Given that player II employs the strategy τ and the initial state is x , player I tries to use a policy $\tilde{\pi}$ such that $V_\lambda(x; \tilde{\pi}, \tau) = \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau)$, which is a function of x and τ , say $\varphi(x; \tau)$. In this work it is supposed that the *main objective of player II is to minimize the utility gained by player I*, and then player II will try to use a stopping time $\tilde{\tau}$ such that $\varphi(x; \tilde{\tau})$ is as close as possible to $\inf_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \varphi(x; \tau)$, which is the (*upper*-)value function of the game and is explicitly determined by

$$V_\lambda^*(x) := \inf_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \left[\sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) \right], \quad x \in S. \quad (9)$$

Interchanging the order in which the supremum and the infimum are taken, the following lower-value function of the game is obtained:

$$V_{\lambda,*}(x) := \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} \left[\inf_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) \right], \quad x \in S. \quad (10)$$

Since $\sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) \geq V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau) \geq \inf_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau)$, these definitions immediately lead to

$$V_\lambda^*(\cdot) \geq V_{\lambda,*}(\cdot). \quad (11)$$

The remainder of the paper is dedicated to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, an idea that is introduced below.

Definition 2.2. A pair $(\pi^*, \tau^*) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{T}$ is a Nash equilibrium if for every state $x \in S$ the following relation holds:

$$V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau^*) \leq V_\lambda(x; \pi^*, \tau^*) \leq V_\lambda(x; \pi^*, \tau), \quad \pi \in \mathcal{P}, \quad \tau \in \mathcal{T}. \quad (12)$$

It follows that if the strategies π^* and τ^* actually used by players I and II form a Nash equilibrium, then if player II keeps on using strategy τ^* , then the first inequality in (12) yields that player I does not have any incentive to switch to other policy. Similarly, the second inequality in (12) implies that if player I keeps on using π^* , then player II does not have any motivation to change the strategy τ^* in use. Also, note that if (π^*, τ^*) is a Nash equilibrium, then (12) implies that

$$V_\lambda^*(\cdot) \leq \sup_{\pi} V_\lambda(\cdot; \pi, \tau^*) \leq V_\lambda(\cdot; \pi^*, \tau^*) \leq \inf_{\tau} V_\lambda(x; \pi^*, \tau) \leq V_{\lambda,*}(\cdot),$$

where the left- and right-most inequalities are due to (9) and (10), respectively, so that via (11), it follows that the upper and lower value functions are equal and coincide with $V_\lambda(\cdot; \pi^*, \tau^*)$, and in this case this function is the value of the game. As already mentioned, the main objective of the paper is to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, and the result in this direction will be stated in the following section.

3. MAIN THEOREM

In this section the main result of this note is stated. To this end the notation in [19] will be followed closely.

Definition 3.1. The space $\llbracket 0, G \rrbracket \subset \mathcal{C}(S)$ is defined by

$$\llbracket 0, G \rrbracket := \{h \in \mathcal{C}(S) \mid 0 \leq h(x) \leq G(x)\}, \quad (13)$$

whereas the operator $T_\lambda: \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ is defined as follows: For each $W \in \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ and $x \in S$,

$$T_\lambda[W](x) := U_\lambda^{-1} \left(\min \left\{ U_\lambda(G(x)), \sup_{a \in A(x)} \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(a) U_\lambda(R(x, a) + W(y)) \right\} \right). \quad (14)$$

Using that R and G are nonnegative and that $U_\lambda(\cdot)$ is increasing, it is not difficult to prove that T_λ transforms $\llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ into itself, as well as to show that the following monotonicity property holds:

$$W, W_1 \in \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket \text{ and } W \leq W_1 \implies T_\lambda[W] \leq T_\lambda[W_1]. \quad (15)$$

A most important property of T_λ , which was established in López-Rivero et al. (2022) [19], states that T_λ is continuous when $\llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ is endowed with the topology of pointwise-convergence.

Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 2.1, suppose that the sequence $\{V_n\} \subset \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ converges pointwise to V , that is,

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} V_n(y) = V(y), \quad y \in S.$$

In this case, $V \in \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ and

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} T_\lambda[V_n](x) = T_\lambda[V](x), \quad x \in S.$$

This result was established as Theorem 4.1 in [19], where the argument relies only on the properties stated in Assumption 2.1. Next, given $\lambda \neq 0$, define the sequence $\{W_{\lambda,n} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ as follows:

$$W_{\lambda,0} = 0, \quad W_{\lambda,n+1} = T_\lambda[W_{\lambda,n}], \quad n \in \mathbb{N}. \quad (16)$$

Since R and G are nonnegative, from (13)–(15) it is not difficult to see that

$$0 \leq W_{\lambda,n}(x) \leq W_{\lambda,n+1}(x) \leq G(x), \quad x \in S, \quad n \in \mathbb{N}, \quad (17)$$

so that, for each $x \in S$, $\{W_{\lambda,n}(x)\}$ converges to a point in $[0, G(x)]$. Set

$$W_{\lambda}^*(x) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} W_{\lambda,n}(x) \in [0, G(x)], \quad x \in S. \quad (18)$$

Taking the limit as n goes to ∞ in both sides of the second equality in (16), via Lemma 3.2 it follows that

$$W_{\lambda}^* = T_{\lambda}[W_{\lambda}^*], \quad (19)$$

that is W_{λ}^* is a fixed point of T_{λ} . Notice that via Definition 3.1, the above display is equivalent to

$$U_{\lambda}(W_{\lambda}^*(x)) = \min \left\{ U_{\lambda}(G(x)), \sup_{a \in A(x)} \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(a) U_{\lambda}(R(x, a) + W_{\lambda}^*(y)) \right\}, \quad x \in S. \quad (20)$$

Moreover, using Assumption 2.1, the inclusion $W_{\lambda}^* \in \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$ and the boundedness of G together imply that there exists a policy $f^* \in \mathbb{F}$ such that,

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(f^*(x)) U_{\lambda}(R(x, f^*(x)) + W_{\lambda}^*(y)) \\ &= \sup_{a \in A(x)} \left[\sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(a) U_{\lambda}(R(x, a) + W_{\lambda}^*(y)) \right], \quad x \in S. \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Now, define the subset S^* of the state space by

$$S^* := \{x \in S \mid W_{\lambda}^*(x) = G(x)\}, \quad (22)$$

and let τ^* be the hitting time of set S^* , that is,

$$\tau^* := \min\{n \in \mathbb{N} \mid X_n \in S^*\}, \quad (23)$$

so that τ^* is a stopping time with respect to the filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t\}$ in (2), and then τ^* belongs to the space $\mathcal{T}$ of admissible strategies for player II. With this notation, the main conclusion of this note can be stated as follows.

Theorem 3.3. Under Assumption 2.1 the following assertions (i) – (iii) hold.

(i) For every $x \in S$, and $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$

$$V_{\lambda}(x; \pi, \tau^*) \leq W_{\lambda}^*(x).$$

(ii) For every $x \in S$, and $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$,

$$V_{\lambda}(x; f^*, \tau) \geq W_{\lambda}^*(x).$$

(iii) $W_{\lambda}^*(\cdot) = V_{\lambda}(\cdot; f^*, \tau^*)$, and the pair $(f^*, \tau^*) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathcal{T}$ is a Nash equilibrium .

This theorem will be established in the following section. Throughout the remainder Assumption 2.1 is enforced.

4. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT

This section contains the main tools that will be used to establish Theorem 3.3. The two main results are stated separately in two lemmas below using the notation in (16)–(23).

Lemma 4.1. For every $x \in S$

$$V_\lambda(x; \pi, \tau^*) \leq W_\lambda^*(x), \quad \pi \in \mathcal{P}. \quad (24)$$

Proof. For each $x \in S \setminus S^*$, note that $W_\lambda^*(x) < G(x)$, by (22). Thus, using (20) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &= \sup_{\tilde{a} \in A(x)} \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(\tilde{a}) U_\lambda(R(x, \tilde{a}) + W_\lambda^*(y)) \\ &\geq \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(a) U_\lambda(R(x, a) + W_\lambda^*(y)), \quad x \in S \setminus S^*, \quad a \in A(x). \end{aligned}$$

Now let $\pi = \{\pi_k\} \in \mathcal{P}$ be arbitrary. Integrating with respect to $\pi_0(\cdot|x)$ it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\geq \sum_{y \in S} \int_{A(x)} p_{x,y}(a) U_\lambda(R(x, a) + W_\lambda^*(y)) \pi_0(da|x) \\ &= E_x^\pi [U_\lambda(R(X_0, A_0) + W_\lambda^*(X_1))], \quad \pi \in \mathcal{P}, \quad x \in S \setminus S^*, \end{aligned}$$

and via the Markov property it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_n)) & \\ &\geq E_{X_n}^\pi [U_\lambda(R(X_n, A_n) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}))] \\ &= E_x^\pi [U_\lambda(R(X_n, A_n) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1})) | \mathcal{F}_n] \text{ on the event } [X_n \in S \setminus S^*], \quad n \in \mathbb{N}. \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Next, it will be shown that for every $x \in S$ and $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$,

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\geq \sum_{k=0}^n E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_k) \right) I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ &\quad + E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_n) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right], \quad n \in \mathbb{N}. \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

To establish this assertion consider the following two cases:

Case 1: $x \in S^*$.

In this case, using that $P_x^\pi[X_0 = x] = 1$ it follows from (23) that $\tau_* = 0$ P_x^π -a.s., and then the right-hand-side of (26) simplifies to

$$E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{0-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_0) \right) I[\tau^* = 0] \right] = E_x^\pi [U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_0))] = U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x))$$

so that (26) is equivalent to the true statement $U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) \geq U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x))$.

Case 2: $x \in S \setminus S^*$.

In this context, it will be shown, by induction, that (26) is valid for every $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$. Observing that $P_x^\pi[\tau^* = 0] = 0 = 1 - P_x^\pi[\tau^* > 0]$, by (23), for $n = 0$ (26) simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\geq E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{0-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_0) \right) I[\tau^* > 0] \right] \\ &= E_x^\pi [U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_0)) I[\tau^* > 0]] = U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) \end{aligned}$$

showing that the claim is valid for $n = 0$. Suppose now that (26) holds for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and observe that

- (a) $\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_n)$ and $I[\tau^* > n]$ are $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable, by (2), as well as
- (b) $I[\tau^* > n] = [X_k \notin S^*, 0 \leq k \leq n] \subset [X_n \notin S^*]$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} E_x^\pi &\left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_n) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \middle| \mathcal{F}_n \right] \\ &= U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_n) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \quad (\text{by (a)}) \\ &= e^{\lambda \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k)} I[\tau^* > n] U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_n)) \quad (\text{by (4)}) \\ &\geq e^{\lambda \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k)} I[\tau^* > n] E_x^\pi [U_\lambda(R(X_n, A_n) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1})) | \mathcal{F}_n] \\ &= E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^n R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \middle| \mathcal{F}_n \right] \end{aligned}$$

where the inequality was obtained combining (25) with property (b), and (4) together with property (a) were used in the last step. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} E_x^\pi &\left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_n) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right] \\ &\geq E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^n R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right] \\ &= E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^n R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau^* = n+1] \right] \\ &\quad + E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^n R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau^* > n+1] \right] \end{aligned}$$

and combining this relation with the induction hypothesis it follows that (26) holds with $n+1$ instead of n , completing the induction argument, so that (26) is also valid when

$x \in S \setminus S^*$. To conclude, using that W_λ^* is nonnegative, notice that (26) implies that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\geq \sum_{k=0}^n E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_k) \right) I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ &\quad + E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right], \quad x \in S, \quad \pi \in \mathcal{P}. \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

Observe now that, by monotone convergence, as $n \rightarrow \infty$

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k=0}^n E_x^\pi \left[e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_k))} I[\tau^* = k] \right] &\rightarrow \sum_{k=0}^\infty E_x^\pi \left[e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_k))} I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^\infty E_x^\pi \left[e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{\tau^*}))} I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^\infty E_x^\pi \left[e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G_\lambda^*(X_{\tau^*}))} I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ &= E_x^\pi \left[e^{\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^*-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G_\lambda^*(X_{\tau^*}))} I[\tau^* < \infty] \right], \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality is due to the fact that $W_\lambda^*(X_{\tau^*}) = G(X_{\tau^*})$ on the event $[\tau^* < \infty]$. Via (3) the above convergence is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{k=0}^n E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{k-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_k) \right) I[\tau^* = k] \right] \\ = E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^*-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_{\tau^*}) \right) I[\tau^* < \infty] \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

On the other hand, using that R is nonnegative, the monotonicity of U_λ yields that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) = U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^\infty R(X_k, A_k) \right),$$

and combining this convergence with $I[\tau^* > n] \searrow I[\tau^* = \infty]$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$, it follows that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* > n] = U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^\infty R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* = \infty]. \quad (29)$$

Now, assume that $\lambda > 0$. In this context $U_\lambda(\cdot)$ is nonnegative, and via Fatou's lemma it follows that

$$\liminf_{n \rightarrow \infty} E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right] \geq E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^\infty R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* = \infty] \right]. \quad (30)$$

On the other hand, if λ is negative it follows that $\left| U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) \right| \leq 1$, since R is nonnegative, and then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* > n] \right] = E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* = \infty] \right],$$

by dominated convergence, so that (30) also holds in this case. Now, taking the inferior limit as n goes to ∞ in (27), via (28) and (30) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\geq E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^*-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G_\lambda^*(X_{\tau^*}) \right) I[\tau^* < \infty] \right] \\ &\quad + E_x^\pi \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau^* = \infty] \right] \\ &= U_\lambda(V(x; \pi, \tau^*)), \quad x \in S, \quad \pi \in \mathcal{P}; \end{aligned}$$

where (8) was used to set the equality, and the conclusion follows using the strict monotonicity of $U_\lambda(\cdot)$. $\square$

Lemma 4.2. For every $x \in S$ and $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ assertions (i) and (ii) hold:

(i) For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \leq n] \right] \\ &\quad + E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

(ii) $W_\lambda^*(x) \leq V_\lambda(x; f^*, \tau)$.

Proof. Combining (20) and (21) it follows that

$$U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) \leq \sum_{y \in S} p_{x,y}(f^*(x)) U_\lambda(R(x, f^*(x)) + W_\lambda^*(y)), \quad x \in S, \quad (32)$$

a relation that via the Markov property leads to

$$U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_n)) \leq E_x^{f^*} [U_\lambda(R(X_n, A_n) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1})) | \mathcal{F}_n], \quad x \in S, \quad n \in \mathbb{N}. \quad (33)$$

Next, (31) will be verified by induction. Let $x \in S$ and $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ be arbitrary. Since τ attains values in $\mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$, combining convention (1) with the equality $P_x^{f^*}[X_0 = x] = 1$

it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}
U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &= U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_0))I[\tau = 0] + U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_0))I[\tau \geq 1] \\
&= U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{0-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_0) \right) I[\tau = 0] + U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_0))I[\tau \geq 1] \\
&\leq U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{0-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_0) \right) I[\tau = 0] \\
&\quad + I[\tau \geq 1] E_x^{f*} [U_\lambda(R(X_0, A_0) + W_\lambda^*(X_1)) | \mathcal{F}_0] \\
&= U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{0-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau = 0] \\
&\quad + E_x^{f*} [U_\lambda(R(X_0, A_0) + W_\lambda^*(X_1))I[\tau \geq 1] | \mathcal{F}_0], \quad P_x^{f*}\text{-a. s.}
\end{aligned}$$

where (33) with $n = 0$ was used to set the inequality, and the inclusion $[\tau \geq 1] \in \mathcal{F}_0$ was used in the last step. Taking the expectation with respect to P_x^{f*} , the above display yields the case $n = 0$ of (31). Next, assume that $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is such that (31) is valid, and observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
&U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \\
&= U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau = n+1] \\
&\quad + U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+2]
\end{aligned}$$

whereas, using (4),

$$\begin{aligned}
&U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+2] \\
&= e^{\lambda \sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t)} I[\tau \geq n+2] U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1})) \\
&\leq e^{\lambda \sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t)} I[\tau \geq n+2] E_x^{f*} [U_\lambda(R(X_{n+1}, A_{n+1}) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+2})) | \mathcal{F}_{n+1}] \\
&= E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{n+1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+2}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+2] \middle| \mathcal{F}_{n+1} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

where (33) with $n+1$ instead of n was used to set the inequality, and the second equality was obtained combining (4) with the fact that $e^{\lambda \sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t)} I[\tau \geq n+2]$ is

$\mathcal{F}_{n+1}$ -measurable. These two last displays together imply that

$$\begin{aligned} E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \\ \leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau = n+1] \right] \\ + E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{n+1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+2}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+2] \right], \end{aligned}$$

and combining this relation with the induction hypothesis it follows that (31) holds with $n+1$ instead of n , completing the induction argument.

(ii) Consider the following exhaustive cases:

Case 1: $\lambda > 0$, so that the increasing function $U_\lambda(\cdot)$ is nonnegative.

In this context, observe that following facts (a) and (b):

(a) Notice that $U_\lambda(\sum_{k=0}^\infty R(X_k, A_k)) = \infty$, by Assumption 2.1(iv). Thus, if $P_x^{f^*}[\tau = \infty] > 0$ then

$$E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^\infty R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau = \infty] \right] = \infty;$$

in this case $\infty = V_\lambda(x; f^*, \tau)$, by (8), and it follows that

$$V_\lambda(x; f^*, \tau) \geq W_\lambda^*(x). \quad (34)$$

(b) If $E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] = \infty$ then, using that $G(\cdot) \geq 0$,

$$\begin{aligned} E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + G(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\ \geq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] = \infty \end{aligned}$$

and via (8) it follows that (34) also holds.

By (a) and (b), to establish (34) in the general case, it is now sufficient to assume that

$$P_x^{f^*}[\tau = \infty] = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] < \infty. \quad (35)$$

Under these conditions, the monotone convergence theorem yields that, as $n \rightarrow \infty$,

$$\begin{aligned} E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \leq n] \right] \\ \nearrow E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

Next, observe that (4) and (35) together imply that

$$\begin{aligned}
E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\
\leq E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + \|W_\lambda^*\| \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\
\leq e^{\lambda \|W_\lambda^*\|} E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] < \infty,
\end{aligned}$$

and then (36) immediately yields that

$$\begin{aligned}
E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] & \quad (37) \\
= E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\
- E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W_\lambda(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \leq n] \right] \\
\rightarrow 0 \text{ as } n \rightarrow \infty.
\end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, using (4) repeatedly, observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &\leq E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \\
&\leq E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + \|W_\lambda^*\| \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \\
&\leq e^{\lambda \|W_\lambda^*\|} E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \\
&\leq e^{\lambda \|W_\lambda^*\|} E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \\
&\leq e^{\lambda \|W_\lambda^*\|} E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right],
\end{aligned}$$

where the third inequality is due to the fact that $U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) \right) \geq U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) \right)$ on the event $[\tau \geq n+1]$, and the fourth inequality is due to the nonnegativity of G . Thus,

$$E_x^{f*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } n \rightarrow \infty.$$

Taking the limit as n goes to ∞ in both sides of (31), the above convergence and (36) together imply that

$$\begin{aligned} W_\lambda^*(x) &\leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\ &\leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \end{aligned}$$

where the inequality $W_\lambda^*(\cdot) \leq G(\cdot)$ was used in the last step. Recalling that the condition that $P_x^{f^*}[\tau = \infty] = 0$ is in force, the above relation and (8) together yield that $W_\lambda^*(x) \leq V_\lambda(x; f^*, \tau)$.

Case 2: $\lambda < 0$, so that $|U_\lambda(\cdot)|$ is decreasing and $U_\lambda(x) \in [-1, 0)$ when $x \in [0, \infty)$, by (3).

In this context, Assumption 2.1(iv) yields that

$$\begin{aligned} \left| U_\lambda \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W(X_\tau) \right) \right| &= e^{\lambda(\sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_k, A_k) + W(X_\tau))} \\ &\leq e^{\lambda\|W\|} (e^{\lambda\delta})^{n+1} \text{ on the event } [\tau \geq n+1], \end{aligned}$$

and it follows that

$$E_x^{f^*} \left[\left| U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^n R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_{n+1}) \right) \right| I[\tau \geq n+1] \right] \leq e^{\lambda\|W_\lambda^*\|} (e^{\lambda\delta})^{n+1} \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } n \rightarrow \infty.$$

On the other hand, observe that $\left| U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) \right| \leq 1$, since R and W_λ^* are nonnegative, and the dominated convergence theorem implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau \leq n] \right] \\ = E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \end{aligned}$$

Taking the limit as n goes to ∞ in (31) the two last displays together imply that

$$\begin{aligned} U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) &\leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + W_\lambda^*(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \\ &\leq E_x^{f^*} \left[U_\lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\tau-1} R(X_t, A_t) + G(X_\tau) \right) I[\tau < \infty] \right] \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality is due to the inclusion $W_\lambda^* \in \llbracket 0, G \rrbracket$. Finally, observe that Assumption 2.1(iv) implies that $U_\lambda(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R(X_t, A_t)) = 0$, and combining this equality with the above display and (8) it follows that $U_\lambda(W_\lambda^*(x)) \leq U_\lambda(V_\lambda(x, f^*, \tau))$, so that $W_\lambda^*(x) \leq V_\lambda(x, f^*, \tau)$. $\square$

5. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT

After the preliminaries in the previous section, Theorem 3.3 can be established as follows.

Proof of the Theorem 3.3 Notice that parts (i) and (ii) follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Next, parts (i) and (ii) together lead to

$$V_\lambda(\cdot; \pi, \tau^*) \leq W_\lambda^*(\cdot) \leq V_\lambda(\cdot; f^*, \tau), \quad (\pi, \tau) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{T},$$

and setting $(\pi, \tau) = (f^*, \tau^*)$ it follows that $W_\lambda^*(\cdot) = V_\lambda(\cdot; f^*, \tau^*)$, so that (f^*, τ^*) is a Nash equilibrium, by Definition 2.2. $\square$

6. CONCLUSION

In this work, Markov stopping games on a denumerable state space were studied. The performance of a pair of strategies was measured by the risk-sensitive total reward criterion, and the problem of establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium was analyzed. Apart from standard continuity-compactness requirements, the basic conditions on the system concern with the reward structure: The terminal reward G is nonnegative, and the running reward R attains values in a compact interval contained in $(0, \infty)$. The main result of the paper, stated in Theorem 3.3, establishes that the value of the game is the fixed point W_λ^* of the operator T_λ in Definition 3.1, and that W_λ^* determines a Nash equilibrium. Extending the results in this work to more general frameworks seems to be an interesting problem.

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